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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARGARET ANN CRAIN, on be- ' 
half of ROG ER LUKE CRAIN and 
JACKIE SUE CRAIN, dependent 
minor children of ELMER LEROY 
CRAIN, Petitioner, 
v. 
,i\T. S. HATCH COlHPANY, THE 
STATE INSURANCE FUND and 
THE INDUSTRIAL COl\11\IIS-
SION OF UTAH, Defendants. 
Case No. 
11002 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
Petitioner seeks review of an order of the Utah 
State Industrial Commission entered July 25, 1967, 
denying her petition for payment directly to her of the 
allowance awarded the minor children. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION 
The commission denied petitioner's request by 
petition for payment of the minor children's allowance 
directly to her, with the result that the allowance con-
tinued to be held in trust for the sole use and benefit 
of the dependent children, as provided in the award 
as originally granted March 24, 1967. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants submit that the Utah State Industrial 
Commission's order denying the petition for payment 
of the dependent and minor children's allowance should 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants will accept the statement of facts as 
set forth by the petitioner, but for the following addi-
tions. 
In the report filed with the Utah State Industrial 
Commission by the Salt Lake County Department of 
Public Welfare concerning the investigation of peti· 
tioner' s case, it appears that: "Actually, Mrs. Crain is 
managing financially and isn't basing her request as 
much on the basis of need as on other reasons." (R.31). 
Further, it was observed that, "She is not pleading 
2 
poverty. She, herself, is investing in real estate and 
has other assets." ( R.32). 
It appears in the record that the commission has, 
on request of the petitioner, given its approval for 
expenditures on the trust funds for necessities required 
by the dependent children ( R.24-25, 30) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE IN-
DUSTRIAL COMMISSION PLACING THE 
AMOUNT AWARDED TO THE DEPEND-
ENT MINOR CHILDREN IN TRUST WAS 
WITHIN THE DISCRETION GRANTED 
THAT BODY BY STATUTE, AND ITS ORDER 
DENYING PETITIONER'S REQUEST THAT 
THE AMOUNT BE PAID DIRECTLY TO 
HER FOR THE USE OF THE CHILDREN 
CAN IN NO WAY BE SAID TO BE ARBI-
TRARY OR CAPRICIOUS. 
There can be no doubt that the Utah State Indus-
trial Commission was acting completely within its statu-
tory discretion when it placed the amount of the award 
to the two minor dependent Crain children in trust 
for their sole use and benefit. 
The Utah State Legislature, by Repl. Vol. Code 
Ann. § 35-1-73 (1966), empowered the commission to 
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grant awards to dependents m case of death in the 
following language: 
The benefits in case of death shall be paid to 
such one or more of the dependents of the dece-
dent for the benefit of the dependents, as may 
be determined by the commission, which may 
apportion the benefits among the dependents 
in such ma111ner as it deems just and equitable ... 
The dependents, or persons to whom benefits are 
paid, shall apply the same to the use of the sev-
eral beneficiaries thereof in compliance with the 
finding and direction of the commission ... 
(Emphasis added.) 
This court, in Sizemore v. Industrial Comm'n of 
Utah, 4 Utah 2d 126, 288 P.2d 788 (1955), has stated 
at 288 P .2d 789, 790, "This statute [Repl. Vol. Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-73 ( 1966) } clothes the commission 
with broad powers to distribute the award in such man-
ner as it deems will best serve the interests, needs and 
welfare of the parties." (Emphasis added.) 
Further the Industrial Commission is given con· 
tinuing jurisdiction to: " ... From time to time make 
such modifications or change with respect to former 
findings, or orders with respect thereto, as in its opinion 
may be justified . . . " Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-78 (1966). 
The general statute of this state dealing with con· 
struction of the statutes, commands: "The statutes . · · 
and their provisions and all proceedings under them 
are to be liberally construed with a view to effect the 
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objects of the statutes and promote justice." Repl. Vol. 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (1961). 
This court, in Barber Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 103 Utah 371, 379, 135 P.2d 266, 270 (1943), 
and North Beck Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 58 
Utah 486, 489, 200 Pac. 111, 112 (1921), has stated: 
"The Industrial Act, including the procedure therein 
provided, must be liberally construed with the purpose 
of effectuating its beneficient and humane objects." 
The commission's practice of placing a wards in 
tru~t for certain dependent beneficiaries thereof, has 
been one of long-standing administrative regularity and 
has been recognized by this court. In Utah Fuel Co. v. 
Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 65 Utah 100, 107, 108, 
234 Pac. 697, 699, 700 (1925), it was held that the em-
ployer and insurance carrier could not object to paying 
the award accessed against them to a banking institu-
tion in trust for beneficiaries, in that: "[T]he Com-
mission has full power to determine how, when, and 
to whom payments shall be made for the use and benefit 
of dependent." 
Though not at issue, it was recited in Tintic Mining 
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 60 Utah 261, 207 
Pac. 1114 (1922), that the amount of the award had 
been placed in trust. 
Thus, in view of the broadly termed legislative grant 
to the commission, the fact that it has been given con-
tinuing jurisdiction, and judicial recognition by this 
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court that the commission has been vested with broad 
discretion, it cannot be doubted that the commission has 
the power to place amounts awarded to minor depend-
ents in trust. To hold otherwise would be to cripple 
its ability in certain cases to fulfill its statutory duty 
to minor dependents. 
Defendants recognize that the commission cannot 
exercise its authority in an arbitrary or capricious man-
ner and submit that its exercise in petitioner's case 
was neither. 
This court has stated in Sizemore v. Industrial 
Comm'n, supra, that in the absence of a showing that 
the actions of the commission in apportionment of awards 
were capricious, arbitrary, or unreasonable to the extent 
that they amounted to a failure to exercise discretion, 
such actions must be affirmed. In Woodburn v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 111 Utah 393, 399, 181 P.2d 209, 212 
( 1947) , this court, citing previous decisions, held the , 
standard to be as follows: 
'Unless therefore it can be said, upon the whole 
record, that the commission clearly acted arbi-
trarily or capriciously in making its findings 
and decision, this court is powerless to interfere. 
* * * It was not intended, * * * that this court, 
in matters of evidence, should to any extent sub-
stitute its judgment for the judgment of the 
. . ' comm1ss1on. 
Petitioner herself, is not a dependent under the 
act; " . . . No person shall be considered as dependent 
unless he is a member of the family of the deceased 
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employee, or bears to him the relationship of husband 
or wife .... " Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-71 
(1966). 
Inasmuch as petitioner is not a "dependent" the 
situation here is not analogous to the fact~ of Davis v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 109 Utah 87, 164 P.2d 740 (1945), 
as contended by petitioner, as in that case the award 
was made to the widow and children, all of them being 
dependent, while in the present case such award was 
made to the minor children only, the petitioner not being 
a dependent. Thus, the award here was not made to a 
family unit but directly to the dependent minor chil-
dren and the rationale of the Davis case is inapplicable. 
Defendents further submits that petitioner is in 
no way aided by contending that an extension of the 
rationale of the case of New Park Mining Co. v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 2 Utah 2d 202, 271 P.2d 842 (1954), 
is in order, as that case concerned the termination of 
payment on an amount awarded the dependent. Here, 
there is no termination, and the issue is how and when 
payment is to be made, and not if it is to be made. 
Petitioner alleges that the funds are completely 
withheld. As it will be seen from the commission's 
order making the award (R.22), and by its authoriza-
tions for expenditudes of trust funds ( R. 24-25, 30), 
the trust funds are presently available for necessities 
required by the minor dependents on application by 
the petitioner and approval by the commission. 
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Petitioner further contends that a basic criticism 
of the commis!)ion' s order is that it arbitrarily sets the 
family's living standard at a level below what is neces-
sary. Defendants submit that this conclusion is un-
warranted as the investigation conducted by the Salt 
Lake County Welfare Department does not bear out 
this assertion. Its report represented the family as, 
"Managing financially," and stated the request for re-
lease of the trust funds was not based on need as much r 
as other factors (R.31), and that petitioner was not 
"pleading poverty," but had assets of her own and was 
was investing in real estate (R.32). 
Defendants submit that the assumption of the • 
welfare report (R.32), that the disproportionate re· 
sources available as between the two Crain children 
and the child of the Barrett marriage may lead to a 
family disharmony at a later date, as relied on by peti-
tioner in support of her request, is not a sufficiently 
tangible ground on which to base a reversal of the com· j 
mission's considered decision founded on a view of the 
present income, needs and long-term best interest of 
the minor children. It is as plausible and as substantial, 
defendants suggest, that family disharmony might re-
1 
sult at a later date, when these three children reach 
their majority, the Barrett child being well endowed 
to make her chosen start in life, and the two Crain 
children, on reaching majority, finding their trust funds 
are exhausted, and their opportunities limited. Obvi- ' 
ouslv, the children's circumstances can never be com-
plet~ly equated but defendants submit that in view of 
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the fact that the children are presently being adequately 
supported and the trust funds can be reached for neces-
sities, and considering the limited funds available, this 
can be more nearly achieved by leaving the available 
funds where they are, in trust. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants submit that the Industrial Commission 
has in no way exceded its statutory authority. It has 
been granted discretion to disburse the available funds 
in a manner conducive to the best interest of the minor 
children to whom they were awarded, Roger Luke and 
Jackie Sue Crain. From the record, it cannot be said 
the commission acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or 
unreasonable manner. Its decision should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
LEROY S. AXLAND 
Assistant Attorney General 
State of Utah 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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